...check out this true situation:
The other day we went to this Chinese restaurant near Brookfield and stumbled upon the greatest combination of 2 things ever: old woman and tiny hat. She was part of an old lady hat club!! (that's just my guess, but if that's not the case this story becomes 43 times funnier) Anyway- in an amazing display of luckitude, somehow Li had his camera with him and it was on like Spawn (the comic...). After trying unsuccessfully to snag covert tiny hat shot 2.0 from far away, Li finally asks our old Chinese waiter if he would take a picture of those ladies for us. He agrees.
Waiter: Excuse me. That young man likes your hats.
Ladies: giggle giggle, ooooh
When I return I'll have a wicked sweet Super Bowl post or not. Depends on if I can remember what happens.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Monday, January 28, 2008
Weekly update
All I need to hear back from any of you on this entry is:
What is the funniest thing in this commercial?
And in case anyone was ever wondering what the opposite of naked is:
What is the funniest thing in this commercial?
And in case anyone was ever wondering what the opposite of naked is:
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
The Putin Chronicles, part I
The commonplace explanation for Vladimir Putin's acclaim in Russia is pretty straightforward. In the 1990's under Boris Yeltsin, the state scarcely governed, the economy deflated, and the population was in anguish. After Putin took office, it seems to most that order has been re-established, the economy appears to have increased, and the average Russian seems happier with their lives. This narrative has a dynamic simplicity and the Russians seem to buy it.
It is apparent to reasonable people that Russia's postcommunist transformation is a textbook case of what not to do. Almost two decades after communism collapsed, Russia is not a democracy. But it isn't an absolute autocracy like Cuba or North Korea either. It's classification lies between. Russia is a semi-authoritarian regime disguised as a democracy. In this counterfeit democracy, formal institutions that appear democratic hide a system that is authoritarian, oligarchic, and bureaucratic all at once to the point of impairment. It's hard to make clear the line between real and fake. Da, Russia has its political parties, a parliament, trade unions, ect. But in reality they are just Potemkin villages. Russia's elites have been perfecting such deceptions for centuries. Today, the Kremlin even entertains a marginal liberal opposition and other forms of dissent that, accidentally, by their very existence, are part of the sham. This pseudo democracy may turn out to be even more hazardous than the unadulterateed autocracy Russians fought through for decades. Authoritarian or totalitarian regimes at some point create a desire for freedom. Imitation democracies, on the other hand, only serve to degrade liberal democratic institutions and ideals, and the citizens living within them at some point actually long for a real "iron hand." That is not to say that the fight for Russian democracy has no hope. Russians elected both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin assuming that they would ensure order, back democracy, and attain Western standards of living. They did not choose extremists, nationalists, or communists as their leaders, even though they suffered severe hardships. Today, 70% of Russians say they are prepared to live in a free society. For maybe the first time in Russian history, there are no indomitable barriers to prevent that from happening. The largest barrier is the political and economic elites. Because they are not ready to live in a competing society, they try to persuade the world that Russia is not mature enough to be 100% free. In this, they are backed by the West, which tries hard not to agitate Putin for fear of undermining relations with Russia. Eventually, the West will have to choose between cozy relations with the Kremlin or a truly free Russia.
The idea that Putin created an economic miracle is a popular melody sung by both the Kremlin and Western businesses operating in Russia. On the surface, the economy Putin is leading looks lavish. The country's GDP grew from $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006. Economic growth was 6.7% in the first half of 2007 and Russia's economy is now the 10th largest in the world. However, these economic avails have a false bottom-high oil prices-and have been accomplished, at least in part, by protectionism. Putin has failed to stop and work on the inflation and has been forced to freeze food prices. Corporate debt had by Russian companies grew from $40 billion in 1998 to $384 billion in 2007. And larger amounts of Russian investors prefer to take their cash abroad. Elites, who pretend to be openly confident in Russia's future, are flocking to European capitals in droves. Calling Russia an "energy superpower," as the Kremlin likes to do, is a implicit admission of its failure to diversify the economy. Oil and gas make up 63% of Russian exports and 49% of the federal budget. Russia displays all of the essential characteristics of a petrostate: a coalition of power and business, rising of a hyperrich rentier class, systemic corruption, influences from the state in the economy, and rising inequality. Like other petrostates, Russia also avoids modernization. The apportionment of goods and services in Russia's exports is a mere 1.7%, while high-technology exports contribute a commiserable .3%. A nuclear power with a natural resource-based economy is a phenomenon the world has never witnessed before; however, the country's ruling elites are no longer set on their nuclear might. "Hydrocarbon politics" has been equally effective. The more dependent the economy becomes on natural resources, the more the Kremlin tries to focus its power, antagonize the West, and intimidate neighboring nations such as Belarus, Ukraine, and former satellite states. Russia is proof that a petrostate can generate growth without development, but a nuclear petrostate that fails to modernize while holding global ambitions is a bad situation for geopolitics.
It is apparent to reasonable people that Russia's postcommunist transformation is a textbook case of what not to do. Almost two decades after communism collapsed, Russia is not a democracy. But it isn't an absolute autocracy like Cuba or North Korea either. It's classification lies between. Russia is a semi-authoritarian regime disguised as a democracy. In this counterfeit democracy, formal institutions that appear democratic hide a system that is authoritarian, oligarchic, and bureaucratic all at once to the point of impairment. It's hard to make clear the line between real and fake. Da, Russia has its political parties, a parliament, trade unions, ect. But in reality they are just Potemkin villages. Russia's elites have been perfecting such deceptions for centuries. Today, the Kremlin even entertains a marginal liberal opposition and other forms of dissent that, accidentally, by their very existence, are part of the sham. This pseudo democracy may turn out to be even more hazardous than the unadulterateed autocracy Russians fought through for decades. Authoritarian or totalitarian regimes at some point create a desire for freedom. Imitation democracies, on the other hand, only serve to degrade liberal democratic institutions and ideals, and the citizens living within them at some point actually long for a real "iron hand." That is not to say that the fight for Russian democracy has no hope. Russians elected both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin assuming that they would ensure order, back democracy, and attain Western standards of living. They did not choose extremists, nationalists, or communists as their leaders, even though they suffered severe hardships. Today, 70% of Russians say they are prepared to live in a free society. For maybe the first time in Russian history, there are no indomitable barriers to prevent that from happening. The largest barrier is the political and economic elites. Because they are not ready to live in a competing society, they try to persuade the world that Russia is not mature enough to be 100% free. In this, they are backed by the West, which tries hard not to agitate Putin for fear of undermining relations with Russia. Eventually, the West will have to choose between cozy relations with the Kremlin or a truly free Russia.
The idea that Putin created an economic miracle is a popular melody sung by both the Kremlin and Western businesses operating in Russia. On the surface, the economy Putin is leading looks lavish. The country's GDP grew from $200 billion in 1999 to $920 billion in 2006. Economic growth was 6.7% in the first half of 2007 and Russia's economy is now the 10th largest in the world. However, these economic avails have a false bottom-high oil prices-and have been accomplished, at least in part, by protectionism. Putin has failed to stop and work on the inflation and has been forced to freeze food prices. Corporate debt had by Russian companies grew from $40 billion in 1998 to $384 billion in 2007. And larger amounts of Russian investors prefer to take their cash abroad. Elites, who pretend to be openly confident in Russia's future, are flocking to European capitals in droves. Calling Russia an "energy superpower," as the Kremlin likes to do, is a implicit admission of its failure to diversify the economy. Oil and gas make up 63% of Russian exports and 49% of the federal budget. Russia displays all of the essential characteristics of a petrostate: a coalition of power and business, rising of a hyperrich rentier class, systemic corruption, influences from the state in the economy, and rising inequality. Like other petrostates, Russia also avoids modernization. The apportionment of goods and services in Russia's exports is a mere 1.7%, while high-technology exports contribute a commiserable .3%. A nuclear power with a natural resource-based economy is a phenomenon the world has never witnessed before; however, the country's ruling elites are no longer set on their nuclear might. "Hydrocarbon politics" has been equally effective. The more dependent the economy becomes on natural resources, the more the Kremlin tries to focus its power, antagonize the West, and intimidate neighboring nations such as Belarus, Ukraine, and former satellite states. Russia is proof that a petrostate can generate growth without development, but a nuclear petrostate that fails to modernize while holding global ambitions is a bad situation for geopolitics.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
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